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ABSTRACT—Because modern litigation is time-intensive and expensive, a 
consumer has no monetary incentive to sue over a low-value claim—even 
when the defendant has clearly violated that consumer’s legal rights. But the 
defendant may have harmed many consumers in the same way, causing 
significant cumulative damage. By permitting the aggregation of numerous 
small claims, class action lawsuits provide a monetary incentive for lawyers 
and plaintiffs to pursue otherwise low-value suits. Often, an important part 
of this incentive is the “incentive fee,” an additional payment awarded to the 
named plaintiffs as compensation for the time they spend and risks they 
assume in representing the class. But such fees have the potential to create 
dangerous conflicts of interest—named plaintiffs may be “bought off” with 
a large incentive fee to give their approval to an otherwise unfair settlement. 
To avoid this problem, courts must review and approve requests for incentive 
fees. Unfortunately, courts do not adequately evaluate the dangers of 
incentive awards and balance these dangers against the justifications for such 
awards. This Note proposes a new test to better guide courts in assessing the 
propriety of incentive fees. Specifically, courts should look at (1) the amount 
of time and effort that the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation; (2) 
risks that the named plaintiff faced in bringing and advancing the litigation; 
and (3) evidence of conflicts of interest that might prejudice the class. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you wake up one morning to a phone call from an 
unfamiliar number. You answer the call only to be greeted by a prerecorded 
message telling you that you have won a free cruise. Many people receive 
such calls, think of them as minor annoyances, and go on about their day. 
Now imagine getting that same call and several years later walking out of a 
courtroom with $25,000.1 Consumer-protection statutes and the incentive-
fee doctrine in class action lawsuits make this large award possible. While 
$25,000 for a telemarketing call may seem excessive, courts have found that 
a “named plaintiff”2 in a class action lawsuit is entitled to such an award if 
the facts and circumstances of the case support it.3 
 
 1 See Craftwood Lumber Co. v. Interline Brands, Inc., No. 11-CV-4462, 2015 WL 1399367, at *6 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2015) (granting plaintiff’s motion for $25,000 incentive fee). 
 2 Named plaintiffs are those members of a class action lawsuit who actively represent the other 
members of the class. MARGARET M. ZWISLER, CHRISTOPHER S. YATES, WILLIAM R. SHERMAN, 
WILLIAM H. RAWSON & WILLIAM J. RINNER, OVERVIEW OF CLASS/COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AND 
CURRENT TRENDS 403, https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/TheClassActionsGuide-US 
[https://perma.cc/7PZY-HLS3]. 
 3 See infra Part II. Because these fees are awarded mostly in settlement agreements and are 
uncontested by the parties, they are often approved in unpublished opinion orders, even when the amount 
is quite large. See, e.g., Benzion v. Vivint, Inc., No. 12-61826, ¶ 14 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2015) (approving 
115:919 (2020) Plaintiff Incentive Fees in Class Action Lawsuits 
921 
Recently, attorneys and named plaintiffs have pushed the boundaries on 
incentive fees. Plaintiffs typically receive incentive fees somewhere in the 
area of $5,000,4 but in a recent high-profile case, class counsel requested a 
$50,000 incentive fee for the sole named plaintiff.5 The court cut the 
incentive fee in half to bring the award on par with what was awarded in a 
similar case in the district.6 But litigants will likely continue to push the 
boundaries on incentive fees because all parties advancing the litigation have 
the potential to benefit by doing so at the expense of the class members at 
large. This is because class counsel and defendants have an incentive to 
strike collusive settlements where defendants pay less to settle, class counsel 
gets a larger attorney’s fee, and the cost of buying the plaintiff’s approval of 
the collusive settlement is relatively modest.7 
This Note argues incentive fees are necessary in certain contexts to 
meaningfully enforce the law, but that some requests for incentive fees are 
excessive and should be reduced. Unfortunately, the prevailing framework 
for assessing the appropriateness of an incentive fee obscures important 
issues for courts to consider and is too confusing for courts to apply in any 
consistent, meaningful way. Currently, a majority of federal courts assess the 
appropriateness of incentive fees using a factor test set forth by the Seventh 
Circuit.8 The factors include: the actions the named plaintiff has taken to 
protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class benefitted from 
those actions, and the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in 
pursuing the litigation.9 Unfortunately, these factors fail to account for 
conflicts of interest that may arise between the named plaintiff and other 
class members, and so courts fail to consistently protect the interests of the 
class as a whole. New guidance would help ensure that district courts do not 
 
$20,000 incentive fee); Desai v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 11-CV-01925, ¶ 20 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2013) 
(approving a $30,000 incentive fee to each of two named plaintiffs). 
 4 Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting the “modest 
compensation” request of $5,000 as in line with what “named plaintiffs typically receive”). But see, e.g., 
Butler v. Am. Cable & Tel., LLC, No. 09-CV-5336, 2011 WL 2708399, at *9 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2011) 
(finding incentive award requests of $5,000 to be excessive). 
 5 Charvat v. Valente, No. 12-CV-05746, 2019 WL 5576932, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2019); see also 
Porter Wells, Cruise Lines Get Final OK for $12.5 Million Robocall Settlement, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 
29, 2019, 4:42 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/cruise-lines-get-final-ok-for-12-5-
million-robocall-settlement [https://perma.cc/4NJN-8SSF]. 
 6 Charvat, No. 12-CV-05746, 2019 WL 5576932, at *10. 
 7 See infra Section II.D.2. 
 8 See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 9 Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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grant excessive incentive fees that could cause significant conflicts of 
interest between the named plaintiff and other class members. 
Part I of this Note explains how class action lawsuits and incentive fees 
are crucial to the enforcement of consumer-protection statutes. Part II 
discusses the current inadequate state of the law regarding incentive fees. 
Part III proposes a new framework that should guide courts in determining 
whether an incentive fee is proper.  
I. CONSUMER-PROTECTION LAWS, CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS, AND 
INCENTIVE FEES 
Before discussing incentive fees, it is important to understand the class 
action mechanism and the types of cases in which incentive fees play an 
important role. While incentive fees can be awarded in any type of class 
action,10 incentive fees are particularly important for the enforcement of 
consumer-protection statutes.11  
Section I.A overviews the origins and underlying purposes of 
consumer-protection statutes. Section I.B discusses the role of the class 
action lawsuit in ensuring that attorneys have adequate economic incentives 
to pursue consumer-protection claims. Subsection C identifies the need for 
incentive fees to ensure the participation of named plaintiffs (a requirement 
for every class action lawsuit). Subsection D briefly describes the mechanics 
of the consumer class action lawsuit. 
A. The Purpose of Consumer Class Action Laws 
Congress has passed consumer-protection laws to protect consumers 
from certain business practices perceived as unscrupulous. One such law, the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), protects consumers from 
unwanted, intrusive solicitations by making it unlawful for anyone to make 
robocalls for telemarketing purposes without prior consent from the 
recipient.12 Another such law, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
(FDCPA), explicitly states that it was enacted to stop debt collectors from 
 
 10 See generally 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:28 (16th ed. 
2019) (describing the legal parameters of class action lawsuits). 
 11 See infra Section I.C. 
 12 47 U.S.C. § 227; Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that 
Congress “passed the TCPA to protect individual consumers from receiving intrusive and unwanted 
calls”); see also Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2343–44 (2020) (upholding the 
TCPA’s restriction on robocalls to cell phones). 
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engaging in harmful behavior.13 The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from 
using any tactic considered to be abusive, deceptive, or unfair in connection 
with the collection of an alleged debt.14 
Both the FDCPA and TCPA allow claimants to bring a civil lawsuit 
against a defendant for allegedly violating the statute.15 In most civil cases, 
the plaintiff is required to prove that they suffered damages in order to 
recover money from the defendant.16 However, because the TCPA, FDCPA, 
and similar consumer-protection laws prohibit activities that many would 
consider to be mere annoyances—often resulting in little discernible 
monetary harm17—many of these statutes specify the exact dollar amount 
plaintiffs may recover in damages.18 Thus, by providing for statutory 
damages, these laws remove an important obstacle to the plaintiff’s recovery: 
proving specific damages resulting from the defendant’s unlawful conduct. 
 
 13 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)–(b) (“There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair 
debt collection practices by many debt collectors . . . . [and] [e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing 
these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.”). 
 14 Id. § 1692e. The statute enumerates several specific examples of problematic behavior. See, e.g., 
id. § 1692e(2) (communicating false information as to the amount of the debt or the debt collector’s 
financial interest in its collection); id. § 1692e(4) (telling a debtor that nonpayment would result in 
imprisonment); id. § 1692e(8) (communicating false credit information, including not disclosing that the 
consumer has disputed the debt). 
 15 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (“A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of 
court of a State, bring [an action] in an appropriate court of that State.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (“[A]ny 
debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is 
liable to such person.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1996) (establishing that a 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving temporary damages). 
 17 Many people find telemarketing calls to be annoying but would probably be hard-pressed to 
articulate how they lost money by merely receiving such calls. At first glance, it may appear that unfair 
debt-collection practices could cause discernible monetary harm, but the circumstances in which harm 
would arise from such practices are narrow. If a debt is valid, and the debt collector employs high-pressure 
tactics to collect the debt, the debtor cannot argue that they suffered monetary harm because the consumer 
incurred the debt of their own will and has a legal obligation to pay it. And unless the conduct was 
“extreme and outrageous . . . beyond all bounds of decency,” the debtor would not have a claim for 
emotional distress. THOMPSON REUTERS, PLAINTIFF’S PROOF OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE § 19:12 (2020). 
The illustrative case of harm arising from unfair debt-collection practices is when a credit agency sends 
a credit report to a prospective lender but fails to report that a consumer has disputed a debt on that credit 
report, which results in the consumer being turned down for a loan. However, aside from the fact that 
other factors may have played a role in the consumer being denied a loan, the consumer would still need 
to show that the denial of this specific loan caused them harm, which would require the plaintiff to 
establish that they had no alternate means of financing and that the lack of funds resulted in damage to 
them that could have otherwise been avoided. 
 18 See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (providing for $500 in 
damages per violation); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (providing for 
up to $1,000 in damages per cause of action). 
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Essentially, consumer-protection laws like the TCPA and FDCPA serve 
a gap-filling function. They prohibit conduct perceived as detrimental to 
consumers that, although unworthy of criminal punishment, was not deterred 
by traditional civil law mechanisms.19 By explicitly prohibiting certain 
conduct and removing barriers to recovery, these laws make it easier for 
consumers to hold businesses accountable for conduct deemed harmful by 
the legislature.20 
B. The Representation Problem in Consumer Class Actions 
Consumer-protection statutes like the TCPA and FDCPA are enforced 
largely through private lawsuits21 whereby an attorney representing a 
consumer (i.e., the plaintiff) will file a complaint with the court alleging that 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the defendant.22 Plaintiffs’ 
 
 19 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2, 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 
(noting that telephone calls are a nuisance and that the restrictions provided for in the TCPA are necessary 
to address this nuisance); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (stating as part of a 
congressional finding of and declaration of purpose that “[e]xisting laws and procedures for redressing 
these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers”). 
 20 Scholars and others argue whether these consumer-protection laws are unwise as a matter of public 
policy. See, e.g., Yuri R. Linetsky, Protection of “Innocent Lawbreakers”: Striking the Right Balance in 
the Private Enforcement of the Anti “Junk Fax” Provisions of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 
90 NEB. L. REV. 70, 72 (2011) (arguing that the benefits of certain provisions of the TCPA are outweighed 
by the harm they cause to small businesses). The merits of these arguments—and the merits of consumer-
protection laws in general—will not be addressed here. For better or worse, consumer-protection laws 
such as the TCPA and FDCPA are on the books, and courts should not assume that Congress passed 
essentially unenforceable laws. Therefore, the common law surrounding consumer-protection statutes 
must be developed to render them enforceable, thus making the incentive-fee doctrine necessary. See 
infra Section I.C. One may argue that Congress has disfavored incentive fees by passing the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which bans incentive awards in securities class action 
lawsuits. See Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 960 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009). However, securities 
class actions are of a different nature than consumer class actions because large shareholders presumably 
stand to recover a significant sum if the suit is successful, thus obviating the need for an incentive award. 
See, e.g., In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh’g 
(May 22, 1992). In fact, what the PSLRA did was to put the onus on courts to select the best representative 
for the class, which courts have determined to be the person with the largest financial stake in the 
litigation. Although Congress expressed concern that incentive fees could be abused when it passed the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, see Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 960 n.4, Congress did not ban the practice 
of awarding incentive fees, which indicates that Congress did not intend to repudiate the practice of 
awarding incentive fees in class actions, other than in securities class actions specifically. 
 21 See Court Finds Private Cause of Action in Florida TCPA Suit Condon v. Off. Depot, 7 ANDREWS 
TELECOMM. INDUS. LITIG. REP. 10 (2003); Marjorie Wengert, Cause of Action for Violation of Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act [15 U.S.C.A §§ 1692-1692o], in 29 CAUSES OF ACTION SECOND SERIES (2d ed. 
2020) (noting that a defendant can be civilly liable to “any person” who is harmed by that defendant’s 
violation of the FDCPA (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a))). 
 22 How Does a Lawsuit Work? Basic Steps in the Civil Litigation Process, STOEL RIVES LLP (Jan. 
24, 2012), https://www.stoel.com/legal-insights/article/how-does-a-lawsuit-work-basic-steps-in-the-
civil-litigation-process [https://perma.cc/89SQ-U42R]. 
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attorneys in these cases are typically compensated by receiving a percentage 
of the recovery obtained for the plaintiff.23 Because the damages provided by 
consumer-protection statutes are typically small,24 a lawyer will never have 
a sufficient monetary incentive to represent an individual plaintiff.25 The 
TCPA, for example, provides that an individual can recover $500 for each 
robocall they receive without prior consent.26 Assume that a plaintiff wants 
to bring a lawsuit against a telemarketer after receiving ten such calls, and 
that an attorney charges a fee of 25% of the recovery for bringing a 
successful TCPA action.27 If successful at trial, the plaintiff would be 
awarded $5,000. The attorney would be entitled to $1,250 of this award, 
which is significantly less than the minimum cost of $18,000 to try the case.28 
Moreover, the attorney might lose, resulting in no recovery at all.29 Because 
of the inherent risks of bringing a lawsuit to trial, parties in a lawsuit 
overwhelmingly choose to settle the claims rather than gamble on an 
expensive trial.30 Such settlements account for the risk of failure at trial and 
 
 23 Silvers, Langsam & Weitzman, PC, What Is a Plaintiff’s Attorney?, HG.ORG, 
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/what-is-a-plaintiff-s-attorney-6728 [https://perma.cc/6JTV-MED3]. 
 24 See, e.g., Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (providing for $500 in 
damages per violation); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) (providing for 
up to $1,000 in damages per cause of action). 
 25 It costs $400 just to file a complaint in federal court, which does not even account for the time it 
takes to draft the complaint, fill out the other applicable forms, serve a summons, or take any additional 
action that follows if the defendant responds to the complaint. U.S. DIST. CT. W.D. WASH., A PRO SE 
GUIDE TO FILING YOUR LAWSUIT IN FEDERAL COURT 10–16 (2015), 
https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd/files/ProSeManual4_8_2013wforms.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8QD3-W2UX]. 
 26 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 
 27 This percentage is comparable to the typical attorney fees that courts have allowed in TCPA class 
actions. In re Cap. One Tel. Consumer Prot. Act Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 781, 797 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“[I]f the 
published empirical data discussed above accurately reflect the fees awarded in TCPA class actions, it is 
fair to conclude that class members would have negotiated an across-the-board fee somewhere between 
20% and 24% of the settlement fund.” (citing Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action 
Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010))); see also Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES 248 (2010); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action 
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004); Hashw v. Dep’t Stores Nat’l 
Bank, 182 F. Supp. 3d 935, 951 (D. Minn. 2016) (“The Eighth Circuit has instructed that fee awards in 
the 20–25% range are reasonable.”). 
 28 The plaintiff’s total cost of a trial can range from $18,000 to $109,000. See Paula Hannaford-Agor 
& Nicole L. Waters, CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 5 (2013), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/25337/csph_online2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B2WT-RQBG]. 
 29 See Silvers, Langsam & Weitzman, PC, supra note 23.  
 30 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 745, 747 (2010) (“[T]rials are an increasingly small part of the daily routine of the federal trial courts. 
Most district courts now try very few civil or criminal cases . . . .”). A government survey released in 
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result in plaintiffs receiving less than they would have been entitled to if they 
were successful at trial. If the attorney in our hypothetical TCPA action 
settled for, on average, one-fifth of the claimed damages to avoid the costs 
of a trial, the attorney could expect to recover $150, not even enough to pay 
for the time spent drafting the complaint.31 
The solution to this representation problem is the class action lawsuit, 
which allows multiple similar claims to be aggregated into a single cause of 
action.32 An attorney has no incentive to bring a lawsuit against one 
defendant for making ten calls to one person in violation of the TCPA. 
However, if that same defendant placed one million calls to several hundred 
thousand individuals, that same attorney would win a $500,000,000 
judgment if successful at trial.33 Thus, the aggregation mechanism of the 
class action lawsuit incentivizes attorneys to represent a class where they 
otherwise would not have represented individuals.34 The class action lawsuit 
is the only effective mechanism for private enforcement of consumer-
protection statutes like the TCPA and FDCPA where individual recoveries 
tend to be small.35 Some statutes like the FDCPA have solved the attorney-
representation problem by providing that attorneys can recover reasonable 
fees for bringing successful actions under the statute.36 But this only works 
sometimes under the FDCPA because one individual may not be harmed 
enough by a debt-collection practice to sue individually. Thus, providing for 
 
2004 estimated that trial dispositions represent only 3% of all general civil matters. Press Release, Bureau 
of Just. Stat., Plaintiffs Won 55 Percent of Civil Trials in the Nation’s 75 Most Populous Counties During 
2001 (Apr. 18, 2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/ctc_mmt01.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y48W-
SEEH]. 
 31 Based on one firm’s fee request, an attorney would have to complete the entire case in half an hour 
for this hypothetical suit to make economic sense. See Vandervort v. Balboa Cap. Corp., 8 F. Supp. 3d 
1200, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (accepting hourly rates between $300 and $400 as a cross-check for 
analyzing a fee request in a TCPA class action). 
 32 See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The device is especially important 
when each claim is too small to justify the expense of a separate suit, so that without a class action there 
would be no relief, however meritorious the claims.”). 
 33 At $500 per TCPA violation, 47 U.S.C. § 227, one million violations would add up to 
$500,000,000 in damages. 
 34 Pella, 753 F.3d at 719; see also What Is a Class Action Lawsuit?, CLASSACTION.ORG, 
https://www.classaction.org/learn/what-is-a-class-action [https://perma.cc/7YB9-XE6N] (“Class 
actions, by aggregating the legal rights of hundreds or even thousands of people, level the playing field 
between individuals and corporations. Because the settlements and verdicts in class actions can be quite 
large, this type of lawsuit provides a strong financial incentive for skilled attorneys to represent 
individuals in class actions.”). 
 35 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the 
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for 
any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 
109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))). 
36 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). 
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attorney’s fees under the TCPA would not address the plaintiff problem 
discussed below. 
C. The Plaintiff Problem in Consumer Class Actions 
Even if an attorney is willing to bring a class action lawsuit under the 
TCPA or FDCPA, another important element must be satisfied before 
bringing the suit. In a class action lawsuit, one or more class members must 
serve as class representatives,37 or so-called named plaintiffs.38 Named 
plaintiffs are the class members responsible for participating in the litigation 
on behalf of the absentee class members.39 The responsibilities of named 
plaintiffs include sitting for depositions, approving any settlement terms, and 
generally monitoring and corresponding with class counsel.40 The problem 
is that, although these duties are often modest,41 the prospect of recovering 
as little as $2042 is not sufficient to induce a rational person to assume them. 
To make matters worse, named plaintiffs also expose themselves to attacks 
on their character43 and to liability if, for example, the court finds the lawsuit 
frivolous.44 To solve this problem, attorneys began negotiating incentive-fee 
clauses into settlement agreements.45 The incentive fee is paid to the named 
 
 37 Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating lawyers “still have 
to find someone who is a member of the prospective class to agree to be named as plaintiff, because a 
suit cannot be brought without a plaintiff”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Both individuals and entities can 
serve as named plaintiffs. Compare Morlan v. Universal Guar. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. 99-274-GPM, 
2003 WL 22764868 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2003) (four individual named plaintiffs), with Craftwood Lumber 
Co. v. Interline Brands, Inc., No. 11-CV-4462, 2015 WL 1399367 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2015) (one 
corporate named plaintiff). 
 38 See Senne v. Kan. City Royals Baseball Corp., 114 F. Supp. 3d 906, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(referring to class representatives as “named Plaintiffs”). 
 39 Most of the efficiency advantages of class action litigation would be defeated if every class 
member were required to participate in the litigation. 
 40 Donald Daucher, Fair and Adequate Representation Under Rule 23(a)(4), Independence and 
Improper Relationships and Arrangements Between Named Representatives and Class Counsel, 37 W. 
ST. U. L. REV. 135, 136 (2010) (“[A class representative] may be expected to spend time and/or money 
on behalf of the class learning about or even controlling the case; responding to discovery; supervising 
counsel; and, in some instances, being responsible for the costs of the litigation, including notice to the 
class.”). 
 41 See Espenscheid, 688 F.3d at 876. 
 42 See Gehrich v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 316 F.R.D. 215, 228 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (noting that the 
typical recovery in TCPA cases is approximately between $20 and $140). 
 43 See Daucher, supra note 40, at 136 (noting that defense counsel will investigate the “character, 
intelligence, and physical health” of the named plaintiff for adequacy (footnotes omitted)). 
 44 Espenscheid, 688 F.3d at 876 (noting that a plaintiff could be responsible for paying a defendant’s 
attorney’s fees if the suit is held to be frivolous). 
 45 See 5 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 17:2 (5th ed. 2019) (noting that the practice of providing for incentive awards predates courts’ 
reference to them). 
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plaintiffs46 for their work on behalf of absentee class members during the 
litigation, for the risks that they assume in acting as named plaintiffs, and for 
serving as “private attorneys general” to enforce civil law.47 
The Seventh Circuit has held that incentive fees are justified when 
necessary to induce individuals to become named plaintiffs.48 Class action 
lawsuits for violations of consumer-protection statutes are a paradigmatic 
example.49 Because individual class members stand to recover only modest 
amounts, it makes no economic sense for any one of them to go through the 
time and effort of serving as a named plaintiff.50 As a result, absent an 
incentive fee, a multimillion-dollar consumer class action case might not be 
brought for want of a named plaintiff. Therefore, when individual recoveries 
are small, incentive fees provide a necessary enforcement mechanism for 
consumer-protection statutes.51 
D. The Mechanics of the Class Action Lawsuit 
In order to clarify the role of incentive fees within consumer class action 
lawsuits for damages, this Section will briefly describe the mechanics of 
these class action suits. For purposes of this discussion, the parties involved 
in a class action lawsuit consist of the attorneys for the plaintiffs (class 
counsel), the named plaintiffs (class representatives), absentee class 
members (unnamed plaintiffs), and defendants.52 As previously noted, a 
lawsuit commences with the plaintiff’s attorney filing a complaint, and the 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. (quoting In re Continental/Midlantic S’holders Litig., No. 86-6872, 1987 WL 16678, at *4 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1987)); see also Jed S. Rakoff, The Cure for Corporate Wrongdoing: Class Actions vs. 
Individual Prosecutions, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 29, 2015), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/11/19/cure-corporate-wrongdoing-class-actions/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y2HM-NXBV] (discussing the origins of the concept of the private attorney general 
and its evolution into class action litigation). 
 48 In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that incentive fees are 
proper when the lawsuit would not have been brought “without the lure of an incentive award” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 49 One study found that between 2006 and 2011, incentive awards were granted in over 90% of 
consumer class actions. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 45, § 17:7. 
 50 See supra Section I.C. 
 51 See Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that “damages 
per class member tend to be slight” in consumer class actions and that an incentive award can be sufficient 
to motivate a named plaintiff to serve as class representative); see also Clinton A. Krislov, Scrutiny of the 
Bounty: Incentive Awards for Plaintiffs in Class Litigation, 78 ILL. BAR J. 286, 286 (1990) (“[P]ublic 
policy favoring private civil litigation as a means to promote certain important social values often fails to 
provide adequate compensation or incentive for plaintiffs to take on this burden simply on principle.”). 
 52 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44 
(1991). 
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class action lawsuit is no exception. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 
23 governs class action lawsuits in federal courts.53 
There are four basic prerequisites to bringing a class action suit in 
federal court: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class.54 
Additionally, a consumer class action lawsuit for damages can only be 
maintained if the court determines that the class action mechanism is the best 
method for resolving the dispute.55 The next step is for the court to either 
issue a class-certification order or deny class certification and dismiss the 
suit.56 The certification order must define the class and the class claims, 
issues, or defenses, and must appoint class counsel.57 Even if the court grants 
class certification, the court is able to review and amend this decision until 
the action is complete.58  After certification, the next step is to notify the 
absent class members of the action.59 The court can also order that notice be 
provided to absent class members with respect to any subsequent step in the 
action.60 Unlike a normal lawsuit, where the parties can agree to voluntarily 
settle and dismiss the action, the terms of any proposed settlement must be 
 
 53 FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rules regarding class actions brought in state court are governed by the 
procedural rules of that particular state. 
 54 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 55 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that “questions of law or fact common to the members of 
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”). Class 
action lawsuits can alternatively be brought under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2). Id. Rule 23(b)(1) would 
only apply if individuals could be expected to bring separate lawsuits. Since individual lawsuits are never 
expected in consumer class actions, Rule 23(b)(1) is not a realistic basis for consumer class action 
lawsuits. Rule 23(b)(2) applies to cases seeking injunctive (i.e., nonmonetary) relief to stop ongoing 
harms. It does not allow a class to seek damages. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 56 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
 57 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). The appointment of class counsel will generally be the attorneys who 
have filed the complaint on behalf of the class and thus have invested the most time and effort into the 
case to date. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(i) (requiring the court to consider the time that counsel has 
spent identifying and investigating the claims). 
 58 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). 
 59 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
 60 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(B)(i). 
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approved by the court.61 Before this happens, absent class members must be 
provided notice of the settlement62 and be given an opportunity to object to 
any of the terms of the settlement with the court.63 In order to approve a 
settlement, the court must find the settlement to be “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”64 
A class action settlement will specify how much the defendants will pay 
(the recovery) and how much of the recovery will go to attorney’s fees, 
incentive fees, and to the class members.65 Attorney’s fees are often assessed 
as a percentage of the recovery, with fees in a typical TCPA class action, for 
example, ranging between 20% to 24% of the recovery.66 In contrast to 
attorney’s fees, incentive fees are rarely large enough to have a meaningful 
impact on the class recovery.67 Incentive awards, however, are still 
significantly larger than the typical pro rata recovery in a consumer class 
action.68 
If the class wins at trial rather than settling, it is less clear whether there 
is a valid legal basis for awarding incentive fees, although some courts have 
granted such post-verdict awards.69 As a matter of policy, post-verdict 
incentive awards would make sense because without them a named plaintiff 
would never have a monetary incentive to go to trial, even if going to trial 
 
 61 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(A). 
 62 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(B). 
 63 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(A). 
 64 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C). 
 65 In “common-fund” settlements, the amounts that the defendant will pay and what the parties 
receive is known at the time of settlement. In “claims-made” settlements, the amount made available for 
payment is specified, but the amounts actually paid to class members and for attorney’s fees are 
contingent on the number of claims filed. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 10, § 6:24. However, in either type 
of settlement, the amount paid for incentive fees will be known at the time of settlement because 
settlements that provide for incentive fees as a percentage of the recovery are “disfavored, if not altogether 
forbidden.” RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 45, § 17:16. 
 66 In re Cap. One Tel. Consumer Prot. Act Litig., 80 F. Supp. 3d 781, 797–98 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“[I]f 
the published empirical data discussed above accurately reflect the fees awarded in TCPA class actions, 
it is fair to conclude that class members would have negotiated an across-the-board fee somewhere 
between 20% and 24% of the settlement fund.”). 
 67 A study of 374 opinions issued between 1993 and 2002 showed that the average incentive fee 
award constituted only 0.16% of the class recovery. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Incentive 
Awards to Class Action Plaintiffs: An Empirical Study, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2006). 
 68 Gehrich v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 316 F.R.D. 215, 228, 239 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (noting that the 
typical pro rata recovery in TCPA cases is approximately between $20 and $140, while $5,000 
incentive awards in TCPA cases are “routinely granted”). 
 69 See Elisabeth M. Sperle, Here Today, Possibly Gone Tomorrow: An Examination of Incentive 
Awards and Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873, 874 (2010) 
(collecting cases and discussing the legal basis for post-verdict incentive awards). 
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was in the best interest of the class.70 Certainly, though, just like any losing 
party, a named plaintiff is entitled to no recovery—and no incentive fee—if 
the lawsuit is unsuccessful. 
II. THE LAW OF INCENTIVE FEES 
While there is no uniform law amongst the federal circuits for how 
district courts should treat incentive fee requests, there is “near-universal 
recognition” that incentive fees are sometimes appropriate.71 This Part 
discusses courts’ views about the propriety of incentive fees in general and 
then, if a fee is justified in a given case, how to assess whether the amount 
of an incentive fee is appropriate. 
A. The Propriety of Incentive Fees in General 
There are two prevailing views on the propriety of incentive fees, both 
recognizing that incentive fees are appropriate in some circumstances. The 
first is that incentive fees are justified merely on the basis of named 
plaintiffs’ service to the class.72 The second is that incentive fees are justified 
when necessary to induce individuals to participate as named plaintiffs.73 As 
previously discussed, the small recoveries characteristic of consumer class 
actions provide no monetary incentive for individual class members to 
assume the responsibilities of a named plaintiff.74 Therefore, under either of 
 
 70 Id. at 880–81. 
 71 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 10, § 6:28. 
 72 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
incentive awards “compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for 
financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their 
willingness to act as a private attorney general”); see also Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 613 (4th Cir. 
2015) (citing Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958–59); Humphrey v. United Way of Tex. Gulf Coast, 802 F. Supp. 
2d 847, 868 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (same); Sauby v. City of Fargo, No. 3:07-CV-10, 2009 WL 2168942, at *2 
(D.N.D. July 16, 2009) (same). 
 73 See, e.g., In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that incentive 
fees are proper when the lawsuit would not have been brought “without the lure of an ‘incentive award’”); 
see also Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175, 1197 (11th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 939 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2019); Chieftain Royalty Co. v. Enervest Energy 
Institutional Fund XIII-A, L.P., 888 F.3d 455, 467 (10th Cir. 2017); Baptista v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 
859 F. Supp. 2d 236, 244 (D.R.I. 2012); Humphrey, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 869. Additionally, there appears 
to be another prerequisite to awarding an incentive fee: absent class members must be notified that the 
award is being sought and given the opportunity to object to it. See Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 
231 F.3d 399, 410 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court’s decision to reject incentive fee where class 
counsel did not provide adequate information regarding incentive fee in notice issued to class members). 
It is important for absent class members to be given notice of an award and an opportunity to object to it, 
because objectors play a critical role in ensuring that class action settlements are fair to absent class 
members. 
 74 See supra Section I.C. 
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these views, incentive fees will always be appropriate in successful 
consumer class action lawsuits.75 
The minority view is that courts should be highly skeptical of incentive 
awards. This is the view of the Sixth Circuit, which has permitted incentive 
awards in some circumstances, but has expressed more general discomfort 
than other circuits in allowing incentive fees.76 The Sixth Circuit has not 
articulated any principled criteria for when incentive fees are appropriate, 
but the minority view differs from the majority view by emphasizing the 
dangers of, rather than the justifications for, incentive fees.77 
B. The Cook Test to Determine the Appropriateness of an Incentive Fee 
Determining whether an incentive fee is proper does not answer the 
question of whether the amount requested is appropriate. An incentive fee of 
$5,000 may be considered excessive in one case and far below what a 
plaintiff is entitled to in a different case, even within the same jurisdiction.78 
It is easy to conclude that an incentive fee is proper in a consumer class 
action, but it is not so straightforward to determine whether the dollar amount 
of a proposed fee is appropriate. 
Only one case at the federal appellate level, Cook v. Niedert, has 
formulated criteria for evaluating the dollar amount of a proposed incentive 
fee.79 In Cook, the Seventh Circuit conceived a factor test (the Cook test), 
which has also been adopted by both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, to guide 
district courts in assessing whether the amount of an incentive fee is 
 
 75 The Seventh Circuit follows the stricter inducement standard. Synthroid, 264 F.3d at 723. And in 
the Seventh Circuit, incentive fees are routinely granted in TCPA class actions. Gehrich v. Chase Bank 
USA, N.A., 316 F.R.D. 215, 239 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Theoretically, if a named plaintiff were willing to bring 
the case on principle alone, then a fee would not be appropriate in that circumstance. However, if principle 
was the plaintiff’s sole motivation, then the plaintiff would have no reason to request an incentive fee in 
the first place. In other words—without clear evidence to the contrary—it is appropriate to infer that a 
named plaintiff who requested an incentive fee needed a monetary incentive to serve as a named plaintiff. 
 76 Hadix v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 895, 897–98 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that “there may be circumstances 
where incentive awards are appropriate”); see also RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 45, § 17:3 (noting the 
Sixth Circuit’s skepticism regarding the proliferation of incentive fees). The Sixth Circuit is the only 
circuit to adopt the minority view. It is not clear whether any district courts outside of the Sixth Circuit 
have adopted this position. 
 77 See infra Section II.D for discussion of the dangers of and justifications for incentive fees. 
 78 Compare, e.g., Butler v. Am. Cable & Tel., LLC, No. 09-CV-5336, 2011 WL 2708399, at *9 (N.D. 
Ill. July 12, 2011) (finding incentive award requests of $5,000 to be excessive), with Craftwood Lumber 
Co. v. Interline Brands, Inc., No. 11-CV-4462, 2015 WL 1399367, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2015) (“An 
incentive award of $25,000 is reasonable in this case.”). 
 79 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998). Federal district courts have proposed a few other tests. See 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 45, § 17:13. 
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appropriate.80 According to Cook, courts should consider three factors: “(1) 
the actions the [named] plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class; 
(2) the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions; and (3) 
the amount of time and effort the [named] plaintiff expended in pursuing the 
litigation.”81 
Prior to Cook, at least one federal district court employed a different 
five-factor test: “(1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, 
both financial and otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties 
encountered by the class representative; (3) the amount of time and effort 
spent by the class representative; (4) the duration of the litigation and; (5) 
the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the class representative as a 
result of the litigation.”82 New York district courts have looked at time and 
effort, personal risk, the “ultimate recovery” obtained by the class, and “any 
other burdens sustained by that plaintiff in lending himself or herself to the 
prosecution of the claim.”83 Many of these factors map closely onto the Cook 
test. The remaining factors—other than risk—have no obvious connection to 
the justifications and dangers that are important to consider in assessing 
incentive fees and therefore serve no useful purpose.84 
C. The Inadequacies of the Cook Test 
Most federal circuit courts have not provided clear guidance to district 
courts for reviewing incentive fees.85 The best guidance available is the 
Seventh Circuit’s Cook test, which has been adopted by the Eighth Circuit86 
and Ninth Circuit87 and cited by district courts in every other circuit.88 This 
 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. (citing Cook, 142 F.3d at 1016). 
 82 Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Humphrey 
v. United Way of Tex. Gulf Coast, 802 F. Supp. 2d 847, 869–70 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (applying the Van 
Vranken test). 
 83 See, e.g., Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 84 See infra Section II.D. 
 85 See RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 45, § 17:13 (noting a single test used in the Seventh Circuit 
and adopted only by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits). There are thirteen federal circuits in total. Court Role 
and Structure, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-structure 
[https://perma.cc/UC9P-8B4P]. 
 86 See, e.g., In re U.S. Bancorp Litig., 291 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 87 See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 
1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998)) (“The district court must evaluate [incentive] awards individually, using [the 
Cook factors].”). 
 88 See, e.g., Scovil v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-515-DBH, 2014 WL 1057079, 
at *6 (D. Me. Mar. 14, 2014) (First Circuit); Marsh v. Tauck, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-220-WWE, 2008 WL 
11471097, at *4 (D. Conn. Oct. 30, 2008) (Second Circuit); Good v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 
141, 160 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (Third Circuit); Shealy v. Dixon Hughes, PLLC, No. 2:10-CV-714-DCN, 
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Section illustrates the need for better guidance by explaining that the Cook 
test was poorly conceived, is redundant, and does not address the primary 
concerns that courts should focus on when evaluating incentive fees. As a 
result, Cook obscures important concerns involving incentive fees, which 
causes judicial inefficiencies and may result in injustice. 
1. Poorly Conceived 
The Cook court discussed the incentive fee issue in a single paragraph 
at the end of the opinion.89 After setting forth the factors, the opinion stated 
that “these factors [were] readily satisfied” by citing a few terms of the 
settlement agreement and some circumstances surrounding the litigation.90 
But the court failed to explain why these factors were satisfied. And the 
application of the second factor in particular is not self-explanatory—how 
should a court assess the “degree to which the class has benefited from [the 
named plaintiff’s] actions”? When evaluating this factor, the Cook court 
appeared to focus exclusively on the ultimate recovery obtained for the 
class,91 and this is what many district courts appear to do.92 But does the end 
result say anything about how effective the named plaintiff’s actions were? 
Perhaps the named plaintiff was a bumbling fool whose deposition was 
terrible, but the case was so strong that the class recovered in spite of the 
plaintiff’s ineptitude. Or perhaps a named plaintiff was extremely competent 
and added value to the class, but the class recovery was reduced by 
 
2011 WL 13323837, at *6 (D.S.C. Oct. 24, 2011) (Fourth Circuit); Slipchenko v. Brunel Energy, Inc., 
No. H-11-1465, 2015 WL 338358, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2015) (Fifth Circuit); NILI 2011, LLC v. 
City of Warren, No. 15-CV-13392, 2018 WL 5264236, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2018) (Sixth Circuit); 
O’Brien v. Airport Concessions, Inc., No. 13-CV-01700-CMA-BNB, 2015 WL 232191, at *6 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 16, 2015) (Tenth Circuit); Swift v. BancorpSouth Bank, No. 1:10-CV-00090-GRJ, 2016 WL 
11529613, at *13 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2016) (Eleventh Circuit); Kifafi v. Hilton Hotels Ret. Plan, 999 F. 
Supp. 2d 88, 105 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 89 See Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 90 The full discussion from the opinion is as follows: 
Here these factors are readily satisfied. Cook brought a suit that resulted in structural reforms to 
the Health & Welfare Fund as well as a cash recovery of more than $13 million. In findings that 
were well-supported by the evidence, Special Master McGarr noted that Cook spent hundreds of 
hours with his attorneys and provided them with an “abundance of information.” Most 
significantly, the special master found that, in filing the suit, Cook reasonably feared workplace 
retaliation. In light of the benefit Cook bestowed on his class, the risks he faced in bringing the 
case and the time he spent pursuing it, Judge Manning did not err when she approved a $25,000 
incentive award. 
Id. 
 91 See id. 
 92 See, e.g., Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Co., No. 07-CV-1707, 2016 WL 
806546, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2016), aff’d 877 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that the incentive fee 
requested is unusually high for a case with such a small individual recovery). 
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circumstances beyond the named plaintiff’s control, such as errors 
committed by class counsel. In any event, if the class recovery is what courts 
should look to, why did the second factor say “benefit[] from [named 
plaintiff’s] actions” instead of “the recovery obtained by the class”?93 
In addition to not explaining why the three factors were satisfied, the 
court cited a missing “fourth” factor as the most decisive: “[T]he risks 
[Cook] faced in bringing the case.”94 The specific risk mentioned in Cook 
was the threat of workplace retaliation, but it was not made clear whether 
courts should only consider this specific risk or the issue of risks to the 
plaintiff more broadly as later articulated in Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, 
LLC.95 If risk is supposed to be assessed more broadly under one of the three 
factors, it is not clear which factor it falls under.96 Because the court declined 
to explicate its three factors and explain how risk fits into the articulated 
factors, lower courts have little guidance when applying the test.  
2. Redundant 
Beyond the gaps detailed above, the first factor of the Cook test does 
not appear to address anything that the other two factors do not already cover. 
The first factor indicates that courts should look not just to the results of the 
plaintiff’s actions but also to “the actions [that] the [named] plaintiff has 
taken to protect the interests of the class.”97 Because the third factor 
specifically asks the court to consider the “time and effort” that the named 
plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation,98 Cook must have ascribed a 
particular meaning to “actions” beyond simple time and effort; otherwise, 
the first factor would be rendered superfluous. In other words, it is unclear 
what is relevant to the named plaintiff’s “actions” if the time and effort that 
the plaintiff spent performing these “actions” is considered part of the third 
factor. The opinion does not provide an answer.99 Given this lack of clarity, 
few district court opinions explicitly address this first factor when applying 
the test. For instance, in Craftwood Lumber Co. v. Interline Brands, Inc., the 
 
 93 One factor used by New York district courts does explicitly refer to the ultimate recovery obtained 
by the class. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 94 Cook, 142 F.3d at 1016 (noting that the risk Cook faced in bringing the lawsuit was the most 
important consideration in awarding the incentive fee). 
 95 See 688 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 96 Alternatively, if Cook intended to articulate a four-factor test that included risk to the plaintiff in 
general, courts and commentators have missed the point. See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 
977 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing one of the Cook factors as “reasonabl[e] fear[s of] workplace retaliation”); 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 45, § 17:13 (citing Cook as a three-factor test). 
 97 Cook, 142 F.3d at 1016. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. 
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court approved a $25,000 incentive award based solely on the fact that the 
named plaintiff “spent several hundred hours working on this case” (third 
factor), which resulted in a “significant recovery” (second factor).100 
Furthermore, because of this redundancy and lack of clarity, district courts 
bound to follow Cook sometimes do little more than cite the test and provide 
their own separate justifications for approving the award.101 
Because the term “actions” provides little help in deciphering the 
meaning of the first factor, the important consideration must be how those 
actions “protect the interests of the class.” Fortunately, the Cook test is not 
the only area of class action law that refers to protecting the interests of the 
class: under the FRCP, in order for a class to be certified, the court must 
determine that the class representatives will fairly and adequately “protect 
the interests of the class.”102 Because courts have ascribed meaning to this 
phrase in the context of class certification, these decisions may provide 
insight into the intended meaning of the Cook test’s first factor. In one 
Seventh Circuit case, the court was concerned that the class representatives 
may not have been in a position to protect the interests of the class because 
it appeared that the named plaintiffs may have had a conflict of interest with 
the class.103 The court explained that even the mere possibility of a conflict 
of interest might indicate that the named plaintiff cannot be relied upon to 
protect the interests of the class.104 However, if the Cook test was meant to 
address conflicts of interest with the first factor, there are few—if any—cases 
that explicitly make this connection. 
D. Primary Concerns Regarding Incentive Fees 
The primary concerns involving incentive fees can be thought of as 
falling under two broad categories: (1) justifications and (2) dangers. 
Justifications for incentive fees are generally thought to be based on a theory 
of restitution;105 they compensate named plaintiffs for the time and effort of 
serving as a named plaintiff and for any risk that they incur in pursuing the 
 
 100 No. 11-CV-4462, 2015 WL 1399367, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2015) (citing no other facts in 
justification of the award). 
 101 See, e.g., Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. v. ACE INA Holdings, Inc., No. 07-CV-2898, 2012 WL 651727, at 
*16 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2012) (“As Settlement Class Plaintiffs stress, they were subjected to Liberty’s 
threats of litigation and the Objectors’ accusations of corrupt behavior.”). 
 102 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 103 In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 713–14 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 104 Id. at 715. 
 105 See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 10, § 6:28 (noting that the award of any type of fee from a class 
action settlement is restitutionary). 
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litigation.106 However, incentive fees can pose a danger when they create a 
conflict of interest between the named plaintiffs and the class.107 While the 
third Cook factor does address restitution for the named plaintiffs’ time and 
effort, the Cook test fails to explicitly address these other two considerations: 
risk and conflicts of interest. 
1. Justifications 
All plaintiffs face risks in litigation, and the most basic risk is the risk 
of failure. In a normal lawsuit, an individual plaintiff bears the risk that they 
will have wasted their time in pursuing litigation if it is unsuccessful.108 The 
difference in a class action context is that named plaintiffs alone bear this 
risk on behalf of all absent class members, who are essentially “free rider[s]” 
in any damages recovery and will have invested no time and effort in the 
litigation if it is unsuccessful.109 In other words, named plaintiffs must work 
with class counsel from the first step in the litigation (i.e., filing the 
complaint) all the way to its conclusion, whether by settlement or 
adjudication.110 In contrast, absent class members are simply notified that the 
class action is in process and merely have to submit a claim form for 
damages, unless they want to opt out of the class and pursue litigation as part 
of another lawsuit—which should rarely happen in a consumer class 
action.111 Indeed, once a settlement has been reached, class members rarely 
have to do much of anything in order to share in the recovery.112 Thus, one 
 
 106 Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872, 876–77 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 107 Id. at 876. 
 108 Jack Walsh, Being a Plaintiff Isn’t Bad; It’s Different, SMITHAMUNDSEN (June 10, 2016), 
https://www.salawus.com/insights-alerts-BeingAPlaintiff.html [https://perma.cc/9D5P-X95Y] (noting 
that time and effort on the part of the client is the most significant cost of preparing for litigation). The 
risk of failure in litigation may even lead plaintiffs to accept a settlement that is below its expected value 
because of an aversion to risk. See ROBERT B. CALIHAN, JOHN R. DENT & MARC B. VICTOR, THE ROLE 
OF RISK ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE AND LITIGATION MANAGEMENT 25 (2004), 
https://www.litigationrisk.com/Paper%20on%20Risk%20Analysis%20for%20ABA%20Forum%20on
%20Franchising.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9RQ-CDWF]. 
 109 See Robert Jones, The Ethical Impact of Payments to Named Plaintiffs, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
781, 787–88 (2008). 
 110 See Espenscheid, 688 F.3d at 876 (stating “a suit cannot be brought without a plaintiff”); Eubank 
v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing the role of the named plaintiffs in reviewing 
and approving the settlement). 
 111 See Pella, 753 F.3d at 728 (“Virtually no one who receives notice that he is a member of a class 
in a class action suit opts out.”). But cf. Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(“The bother of submitting a claim, receiving and safeguarding the coupon, and remembering to have it 
with you when shopping may exceed the value of a $10 coupon to many class members.”). 
 112 Gehrich v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 316 F.R.D. 215, 232 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (noting that claimants 
only needed to “check a box and sign their names” in order to submit a claim in that case). In contrast, if 
the claims process is unduly burdensome, the court is unlikely to receive the settlement favorably. See, 
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justification for incentive fees is that absent class members risk practically 
nothing if the litigation is unsuccessful while named plaintiffs bear all the 
risk that their time is wasted if the lawsuit fails.113 And if the lawsuit is 
successful, named plaintiffs would have invested more time and effort than 
absent class members but, without an incentive fee, would be entitled to no 
larger a recovery than these absent class members.114 
Named plaintiffs face additional risks beyond wasting their time. They 
are subject to discovery, and their reputations and credibility are fair game 
for attacks by defendants. And in some cases, the defendant may threaten to 
countersue named plaintiffs and expose them to liability.115 However, when 
there is little risk of failure, courts have recognized that it may be appropriate 
to reduce or deny an incentive award.116 
2. Dangers 
Critics of incentive awards are mainly concerned with the conflicts of 
interest that these additional payments can create between the named 
plaintiffs and the absent class members. For example, thirty years ago 
Clinton Krislov identified the risk of named plaintiffs being “bought off” at 
the class’s expense and noted that courts should scrutinize incentive fees 
accordingly.117 These conflicts of interest are similar to those that are inherent 
between class counsel and the class members due to the economic incentives 
created by the class action mechanism.118 To understand these incentives, it 
is important to examine the interests of each of the parties in a consumer 
class action lawsuit. Intuitively, named plaintiffs, absentee class members, 
and class counsel want to maximize their respective recoveries from the 
 
e.g., Pella, 753 F.3d at 725–26, 729 (reversing district court’s approval of a settlement that included an 
overly complicated and burdensome claims process). 
 113 See Jones, supra note 109, at 788 (stating that the “free rider problem presents a serious obstacle 
to class action litigation”). 
 114 Cf. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997) (“A class representative must 
be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” 
(quoting E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977))). 
 115 Krislov, supra note 51, at 286 (citing a securities class action lawsuit where the named plaintiff 
faced “public threats by defendants designed to intimidate him . . . including a threat of a $5 million 
countersuit”); see also Espenscheid, 688 F.3d at 877 (addressing risks of failure including personal 
liability). Other risks may arise in certain contexts or circumstances, such as the risk that a named plaintiff 
in an employment class action will be retaliated against by their employer for actively participating in the 
suit. Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 116 See, e.g., In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court 
decision to deny incentive awards to corporate named plaintiffs who joined in the middle of the case when 
those plaintiffs were “clear winners” from the start and faced the prospect of a significant recovery). 
 117 Krislov, supra note 51, at 287. 
 118 See Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 
22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69, 71 (2004). 
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defendant with the least amount of effort. For named plaintiffs, this means 
increasing the incentive fee because the individual recoveries in consumer 
class actions tend to be small.119 For the typical absentee class member, this 
means doing as little as possible because the marginal benefit of increasing 
the individual recovery—from say $20 to $30—is worth much less than any 
time invested to do so.120 For class counsel, this means increasing their 
attorney’s fees while minimizing their labor on the case. In contrast, the 
defendant’s primary goal in the litigation is simply to pay as little as possible. 
As a result, the interests of the defendants and class counsel—who are 
normally adversaries—may converge at the expense of the interests of the 
class.121 In other words, class counsel may benefit by offering a settlement 
where defendants pay less money overall but pay more of that money to class 
counsel.122 These types of collusive settlements do not present a problem in 
individual litigation because the plaintiff has a significant stake in any 
recovery (otherwise the case would not have been brought in the first 
place).123 Moreover, the individual plaintiff has leverage to make sure that 
the attorney advocates strongly for her interests with the threat of two simple 
words: you’re fired. 
But in a consumer class action, the individual plaintiff is replaced with 
the named plaintiff, who lacks the authority to fire class counsel.124 Even 
worse, the class counsel seeking a collusive settlement can buy the named 
plaintiff’s acceptance by offering a larger incentive fee. With the named 
plaintiff’s blessing, the collusive settlement looks more legitimate in the eyes 
of the court. Named plaintiffs win in this scenario because any reduction in 
their pro rata recovery for the class will be insignificant in comparison to the 
increased incentive fee that class counsel and defendants can offer. Because 
named plaintiffs can best serve their interests at the expense of the class, the 
conflicts of interest between named plaintiffs and class members are similar 
to those between attorneys and class members.125 
 
 119 See supra Section I.C. 
 120 For absentee class members to have any meaningful leverage in this negotiation, they would have 
to formally object to the settlement with the court. 
 121 See Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The defendant cares only about 
the size of the settlement, not how it is divided between attorneys’ fees and compensation for the class. 
From the selfish standpoint of class counsel and the defendant, therefore, the optimal settlement is one 
modest in overall amount but heavily tilted toward attorneys’ fees.”). 
 122 See 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1797.1 
(3d ed. 1999) (noting that class counsel may have “bias toward settlements in which the class attorney 
agrees to trade off a smaller total award by the defendant for a larger fee”). 
 123 See supra Section I.C. 
 124 This authority rests with the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1). 
 125 Richard A. Nagareda, Restitution, Rent Extraction, and Class Representatives: Implications of 
Incentive Awards, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1483, 1484 (2006) (discussing the similarities). 
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To illustrate this idea, suppose that a fair settlement in a hypothetical 
case would require defendants to pay $12 million, with $2 million going to 
attorney’s fees, an incentive fee of $5,000, and the remainder going to a class 
of 100,000 individuals for a pro rata recovery of approximately $100. 
Hoping to strike a collusive settlement, class counsel agrees to terms where 
defendants pay $11 million, with $3 million going to attorney’s fees, an 
incentive fee of $10,000, and the remainder going to those same 100,000 
class members for a pro rata recovery of approximately $80. Class counsel 
has made an extra $1 million and defendants have saved $1 million. The 
named plaintiff has increased his recovery by $4,980, while the individual 
class members are the only losers. And most of them likely have no idea that 
a fair amount would be $20 higher. This shows how easy it is for defendants 
and class counsel to buy a named plaintiff’s approval of a collusive 
settlement126 and illustrates why judicial review of settlements is necessary 
to ensure that class action settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate.127 
However, conflicts of interest are not limited to situations where the 
dollar figure of the incentive fee appears excessive. Courts have identified 
other circumstances in which problematic conflicts of interest can arise with 
incentive fees. For example, incentive fees become more of a concern where 
there are long-standing relationships between class counsel and named 
plaintiffs.128 Usually, a named plaintiff will serve as a class representative 
once in their lifetime, but there are certain named plaintiffs who serve as 
class representatives on a recurring basis.129 Defendants often attack these 
“professional plaintiffs” as opportunistic—the insinuation being that they are 
capitalizing on the incentive-fee doctrine to cash in by serving as named 
plaintiffs in multiple suits.130 Many courts have found no issue with repeat 
plaintiffs, reasoning that such individuals act as “private attorneys general” 
to enforce consumer-protection laws.131 However, if a professional plaintiff 
 
 126 Some attorneys, brazenly enough, have even sought settlements that specifically award incentive 
fees only to the named plaintiffs who approved the settlement. Not surprisingly, courts readily reject these 
provisions. See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
 127 Krislov, supra note 51, at 287 (“[F]or settlements, courts scrutinize the entire agreement to 
determine whether the named plaintiff has been ‘bought off’ at class expense.”). 
 128 See, e.g., In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 714–16 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that 
class counsel and named plaintiff serving as co-counsel on another case raised conflict-of-interest 
concerns significant enough to hear the issue for the first time on appeal); see also Redman v. RadioShack 
Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 638 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that there should be a “genuine arm’s-length relationship 
between class counsel and the named plaintiffs” that is not influenced by family ties or friendship). 
 129 See Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. (noting that one advantage of repeat plaintiffs is that they “may be better able to monitor 
the conduct of counsel”); Cunningham v. Rapid Response Monitoring Servs., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 
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is represented by the same counsel on multiple occasions—or if they have 
previously worked together—the relationship may be less akin to an 
attorney–client relationship and more akin to a relationship between business 
partners. Courts may become concerned about these close relationships 
between professional plaintiffs and class counsel, particularly if the parties 
do not properly disclose important details regarding their relationships.132 
When there are multiple named plaintiffs in a lawsuit, unequal 
treatment of named plaintiffs is another area of concern—particularly when 
incentive awards are granted only to named plaintiffs who approve the 
settlement.133 This practice is designed to induce the named plaintiffs’ 
approval by improperly using an incentive award as leverage and is generally 
disfavored by courts.134 
At least one federal circuit has expressly disavowed “incentive 
agreements” where class counsel and the named plaintiffs agree to the 
structure and mechanics of the incentive fees at the outset of the litigation as 
opposed to at the end of the litigation.135 Among other things, the court was 
concerned that, by structuring the incentive fee ahead of time as a percentage 
of the recovery, the named plaintiffs had a disincentive to pursue injunctive 
or nonmonetary relief as part of settlement negotiations even if such relief 
was in the best interests of the class members.136 The court was also 
concerned that such agreements could result in potential named plaintiffs 
shopping around for counsel who offered the best deal rather than counsel 
best positioned to represent the class.137 
A final concern—expressed by then-Judge Richard Posner of the 
Seventh Circuit—is that a named plaintiff may have a conflict of interest 
 
1195 (M.D. Tenn. 2017) (noting that there is no “amateurs only” rule in litigation). But there is a school 
of thought that these so-called professional plaintiffs are undesirable, at least in some circumstances. See, 
e.g., Stoops v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 197 F. Supp. 3d 782, 803 (W.D. Pa. 2016) (noting that a plaintiff 
who bought multiple cell phones simply so that she could seek out TCPA violations lacked standing to 
sue). Because Congress was concerned that professional plaintiffs could be harmful in the context of 
securities class actions, it passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which bars so-
called professional plaintiffs from serving as named plaintiffs in securities class actions. See Murray, 
434 F.3d at 954. 
 132 See, e.g., Sw. Airlines, 799 F.3d at 715–16 (reversing named plaintiff’s incentive fee because 
named plaintiff failed to disclose that he had served as co-counsel with class counsel on other cases). 
 133 See, e.g., Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir. 2014) (criticizing a settlement 
agreement that provided incentive awards only to representatives who supported the settlement). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2009). Awards, as opposed to 
agreements, are generally sought after a settlement or verdict has been achieved. Id. at 959. 
 136 Id. at 960. 
 137 Id. 
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with the class if the incentive fee is too large as a percentage of the total 
recovery.138 Some commentators have suggested that courts are reluctant to 
grant an incentive award that is greater than 1% of the total recovery.139 
However, courts can vary widely in their application of this standard.140 
III. FIXING THE INCENTIVE-FEE DOCTRINE 
Primary concerns regarding incentive fees can be summarized in three 
key points: (1) incentive fees are necessary in consumer class actions, (2) 
they are justified to compensate named plaintiffs, and (3) they have the 
potential to create conflicts of interest that could prejudice the class. Against 
the backdrop of these primary issues is the Cook factor test, which 
inadequately addresses many of these concerns and obscures the important 
issues. Two of the three factors are so amorphous that they cannot be 
understood in any meaningful way.141 Possibly because the test was ill-
conceived when the Seventh Circuit created it in 1997, a Westlaw search 
returns no instances where the Seventh Circuit cited the test in any 
subsequent decisions.142 However, district courts within the Seventh Circuit 
are still bound to apply this test143 despite indications that courts should look 
to other criteria when deciding whether to approve incentive fees.144 This 
Note proposes a new three-factor test involving incentive fees that is 
consistent with the justifications and dangers discussed in the previous Part. 
It is clear enough to understand and broad enough to account for unforeseen 
circumstances that could arise in future litigation. This new test mirrors the 




 138 See Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing examples). 
 139 See, e.g., MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 10, § 6:28 (“Proposals to allocate amounts in excess of one 
percent of the common fund will almost certainly be rejected even if the dollar figure itself is within the 
standard range.”). 
 140 Compare, e.g., Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 264 F.R.D. 438, 447–48 
(N.D. Ill. 2009) (denying $7,000 in incentive awards equivalent to 0.23% of a $3 million settlement), with 
Vandervort v. Balboa Cap. Corp., 8 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (approving $10,000 in 
incentive awards equivalent to 0.3% of a $3.3 million maximum settlement fund). 
 141 See supra Sections II.A–II.B. 
 142 If the test had merely needed clarification, the Seventh Circuit could have taken opportunities in 
subsequent cases to explain the test rather than ignore it. See, e.g., In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 
712, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2001) (reviewing an incentive fee); Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, Inc., 231 F.3d 
399, 410 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 143 See, e.g., Craftwood Lumber Co. v. Interline Brands, Inc., No. 11-CV-4462, 2015 WL 1399367, 
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2015). 
 144 See supra Section II.D. 
 145 See supra Section II.D. 
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TABLE 1: OLD COOK FACTOR TEST VS. NEW PROPOSED FACTOR TEST 
Old Cook Factor Test New Proposed Factor Test 
1. The actions the plaintiff has 
taken to protect the interests of the 
class; 
2. The degree to which the class 
has benefitted from those actions; 
and 
3. The amount of time and effort 
the plaintiff expended in pursuing 
the litigation 
1. The amount of time and effort 
the plaintiff expended in pursuing 
the litigation; 
2. Risks that the named plaintiff 
faced in bringing and advancing 
the litigation; and 
3. Evidence of conflicts of interest 
that might prejudice the class 
 
A. Time and Effort 
The time-and-effort factor is the most well-conceived aspect of the 
Cook test. Time and effort maps perfectly to the primary justification for 
incentive awards—restitution to the named plaintiff146—and therefore should 
be the first and most important factor courts consider when deciding whether 
to approve the amount of an incentive fee. It is also straightforward to apply 
since courts can readily determine the hours worked by a named plaintiff.147 
Courts have permitted awards at an average hourly rate of around $100,148 
which provides a useful point of reference. 
Critics of professional plaintiffs—who often request larger fees and 
claim to have done a larger amount of work—may be concerned about the 
apparent ease with which a plaintiff could overstate hours to support a larger 
fee award. But courts have tools to mitigate this problem. At a high level, 
judges understand that lengthier, more complex litigation is likely to involve 
more work on the part of a named plaintiff. In other words, judges can 
estimate a reasonable range of hours that a professional plaintiff could be 
expected to work on a given case. When a professional plaintiff claims to 
have worked a number of hours that falls outside of these expectations, 
 
 146 See supra Section II.D.1. 
 147 In a typical case where the incentive award requested is a few thousand dollars, courts will usually 
accept a sworn affidavit from the named plaintiffs attesting to how many hours they spent on the litigation. 
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 45, § 17:12. 
 148 See Craftwood, 2015 WL 1399367, at *6 (granting named plaintiff a $25,000 incentive fee after 
working “nearly 200 hours” on the case); Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998) (awarding 
a $25,000 incentive fee to named plaintiff who spent hundreds of hours working with the attorneys). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
944 
courts can request additional supporting evidence, such as detailed 
timesheets. Additionally, because defendants in class actions typically 
dislike professional plaintiffs,149 defendants might challenge the accuracy of 
a named plaintiff’s hours estimate. In other words, defendants can signal to 
the court—by disputing or not disputing the named plaintiff’s hours—
whether it should scrutinize the incentive award more carefully.150 
B. Risk 
The most important issue that the Cook court considered was the risk to 
the named plaintiff even though the court did not explicitly list risk in its 
three-factor test.151 Because named plaintiffs should be compensated for 
assuming this risk on behalf of all absentee class members,152 courts should 
always consider the risks that a named plaintiff faced in bringing the 
litigation. For reasons discussed below, the new “risk” factor should replace 
the Cook factor that calls for an examination of the benefit obtained by the 
class. 
1. Applying the New “Risk” Factor 
Courts should consider both litigation and nonlitigation risks as relevant 
to the incentive award.153 In this context, litigation risk refers to the risk that 
a lawsuit will fail on its merits. The primary risk of failure is that the named 
plaintiff will have wasted the time they spent building the case.154 
Economically rational named plaintiffs will be discouraged from investing 
more time and effort into the case as the odds of success decrease.155 This 
reluctance could harm the class if the named plaintiff can increase the 
litigation’s odds of success by investing more time into it. Therefore, to 
properly incentivize the named plaintiff to act in the best interests of the class 
(i.e., invest the necessary time), the named plaintiff needs to be compensated 
 
 149 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 150 Even in collusive settlements, a defendant could object to the incentive fee. By expressing 
disapproval to a small aspect of the settlement, the defendant is signaling to the court that the defendant 
is not fully satisfied and thus the settlement is not collusive. So, while the court should take such 
objections seriously, it should still be vigilant in considering conflict-of-interest issues surrounding the 
incentive fee. 
 151 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. At least one district court has used the Cook factors 
and added its own additional risk factor. Scovil v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-515-
DBH, 2014 WL 1057079, at *6 (D. Me. Mar. 14, 2014). 
 152 See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 153 See supra notes 82–83, 94 and accompanying text. 
 154 See CALIHAN ET AL., supra note 108, at 25. 
 155 This assumes that named plaintiffs are rational economic actors. It is possible that someone would 
serve as a named plaintiff for other reasons, such as personal disdain for the defendant, but this scenario 
is unlikely. 
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for assuming the litigation risk with an appropriate risk-multiplier. So, for 
example, if a $10,000 reward is appropriate in a case that is a clear winner, 
then $20,000 would theoretically be appropriate in that same case if the odds 
of success were only 50%.156 The $20,000 is appropriate because the named 
plaintiff would expect to receive the incentive fee only 50% of the time, 
giving the named plaintiff an expected value of $10,000. 
There is a valid concern that this type of risk-multiplier would produce 
undesirable results if applied proportionally to lawsuits with little chance of 
success. This could happen because plaintiffs would be emboldened to bring 
so-called “strike suit[s]”—lawsuits that have little chance of success and 
marginal social value—where plaintiffs have significant leverage to force 
defendants into a settlement due to the considerable costs of modern 
litigation.157 It would not be difficult to imagine a scenario where an 
opportunistic plaintiff has an opportunistic lawyer file a strike suit and 
negotiate an early settlement with a minimal amount of work. The plaintiff 
could do $1,000 worth of work and justify a $10,000 incentive fee by 
claiming that the suit only had a 10% chance of success. To address this 
concern, courts should have the discretion to adjust the risk-multiplier 
downward when a suit is highly likely to fail. Another possibility would be 
to define “success” as something other than the odds of the class being 
certified. If success were defined as the odds of reaching a settlement prior 
to and without certification, then named plaintiffs in strike suits would have 
a 100% chance of success and be entitled to no risk-multiplier. In other 
words, the probability of success can be thought of in terms of how 
vigorously the defendant contests the litigation. 
Nonlitigation risk is also important to consider in certain contexts. 
Nonlitigation risk can include things ranging from reputational damage to 
retaliation by an employer against a named plaintiff employee. Workplace 
retaliation, which arises in the context of employment-related class actions, 
is the greatest of these risks.158 Courts in those cases should carefully analyze 
such risks as related to individual plaintiffs and defendants on a case-by-case 
basis. Named plaintiffs in consumer class actions face significantly less 
 
 156 In practice, a court cannot accurately assess the strength of a case into a precise percentage chance 
of success or failure, particularly without the benefit of factfinding at trial. Regardless, courts are routinely 
asked to perform these assessments when reviewing other areas of settlements. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. W. 
Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that in reviewing the fairness, reasonableness, 
and adequacy of a settlement, courts should consider, among other things, “the strength of [the] plaintiffs’ 
case” and “the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation”). 
 157 Rakoff, supra note 47. 
 158 See supra note 90 (discussing the named plaintiff’s justified fear of workplace retaliation in an 
employment class action suit). 
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nonlitigation risk, which is typically limited to the modest possibility of 
facing personal liability.159 However, a court could consider the reputational 
harm that repeat named plaintiffs face by being derided as opportunistic 
“professional plaintiffs”160 and other risks that any named plaintiff might face 
in unique circumstances. 
2. Discarding the “Benefit” Analysis 
The reason for assessing whether the incentive fee is disproportionate 
to the benefit received by the class is to determine whether a settlement is 
collusive—that is to say, whether the class is prejudiced by a conflict of 
interest.161 The benefit analysis does not serve as a yardstick for measuring 
the incentive fee to which a plaintiff would be entitled in a given case.162 
Because the third factor of the new test addresses conflicts of interest, and 
the benefit analysis can lead courts astray, it should be discarded. 
Some may argue that the benefit analysis provides a useful benchmark 
for assessing whether an incentive fee is fair, because it is easy to calculate 
the dollar value of the total recovery and to assess the incentive fee as a 
percentage of the total recovery. Courts often use a similar percentage-of-
recovery method to examine the appropriateness of attorney’s fees.163 
However, unlike attorney’s fees, incentive fees represent a very small 
proportion of the total recovery.164 Class counsel—not named plaintiffs—is 
primarily responsible for increasing the recovery for the class, which is why 
time and effort is a more ideal measure for the plaintiff incentive fee, and the 
 
 159 See Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 688 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that the risk 
of facing personal liability is remote). 
 160 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 161 Even courts that disagree as to the propriety of incentive fees in general agree on this point. See 
In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 722 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting an incentive award because 
the negligible recovery for the class showed that the named plaintiffs had “no interest in vigorously 
prosecuting the [interests of] unnamed class members”); Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 
959–60 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting a sliding-scale incentive arrangement that was tied to the ultimate 
recovery because it put the named plaintiffs “into a conflict position from day one”). 
 162 Doing so would essentially ask courts to measure the appropriateness of the fee as a percentage 
of the recovery, which is a disfavored practice when it comes to incentive fees. See supra notes 135–
136 and accompanying text. 
 163 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the “lodestar method”—which assesses 
attorney’s fees based on hours worked—is not as ideal for consumer class actions. See Kolinek v. 
Walgreens Co., 311 F.R.D. 483, 501 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“[F]ee arrangements based on the lodestar method 
require plaintiffs to monitor counsel and ensure that counsel are working efficiently on an hourly basis, 
something a class of nine million lightly-injured plaintiffs likely would not be interested in doing.”). 
 164 See supra notes 66–67. 
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percentage-of-recovery method is more suited to attorney’s fees.165 Looking 
at the incentive fee as a percentage of the recovery does not address any of 
the justifications (i.e., time and effort and risk) for incentive fees. Indeed, the 
only time when the percentage may be relevant is when the fee is unusually 
high as a percentage of the recovery. In these cases, courts can look at the 
size of the fee in the context of the third proposed factor to determine if it 
suggests a conflict of interest. In any case, the benefit factor is becoming 
increasingly irrelevant. For example, in a case where the class obtained a full 
recovery, the Seventh Circuit reversed incentive fees because of other signs 
of conflicts of interest.166 
Furthermore, using the benefit factor may give some named plaintiffs 
the impression that they will be better off by trading injunctive or 
nonmonetary relief—which is often more meaningful in consumer class 
actions—for monetary relief because it is easier to value the benefit of 
money. So, in addition to having limited utility, the benefit factor can also 
create a perverse incentive that ultimately prejudices the class. 
C. Conflicts of Interest 
The first two proposed factors provide a framework for arriving at a 
risk-adjusted measure of appropriate compensation for a named plaintiff in 
normal circumstances, and they directly address the theoretical justifications 
for incentive awards. However, even if an incentive fee is justified based on 
these two factors, stopping here would ignore the primary concern regarding 
incentive fees—the potential for those awards to create prejudicial conflicts 
of interest.167 Several of these conflicts of interest—such as business 
relationships between class counsel and named plaintiffs—have already 
been addressed by courts and should influence the court’s analysis of this 
factor.168 Additionally, a proper conflict-of-interest analysis would also 
address, in many situations, an important consideration raised by scholars: 
monitoring the effectiveness of class counsel.169 
Some may argue that it is redundant to consider conflicts of interest at 
this stage of the case because courts already consider conflicts of interest at 
 
 165 It is worth noting that courts do not assess attorney’s fees using a percentage-of-recovery method 
and the lodestar method. They use one or the other. When both are used, the lodestar is simply brought 
in as a “cross-check” for reasonableness. See Kolinek, 311 F.R.D. at 500 (listing the options). 
 166 In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 167 The adequacy inquiry under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest 
between named parties and the class they seek to represent. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 625 (1997). 
 168 See supra Section II.D.2. 
 169 See, e.g., Harel & Stein, supra note 118, at 103; Nagareda, supra note 125, at 1487–91. 
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earlier stages. For example, courts are supposed to look at whether a class 
representative is adequate to represent the class,170 which is a decision made 
at the class-certification stage—prior to any determination as to whether the 
amount of an incentive fee is appropriate.171 However, conflicts of interest 
are not black and white but rather operate in shades of gray. Some conflicts 
of interest must be tolerated in order for current class action lawsuit 
mechanisms to function.172 Thus, for example, there may be indicators of a 
conflict of interest that do not rise to the level which would justify denying 
class certification but may still justify a reduction of the incentive award. An 
important illustration of this notion is the professional plaintiff. Recall that 
one of the responsibilities of the named plaintiff is to monitor class 
counsel.173 By virtue of their experience, professional plaintiffs are generally 
in a better position to assess the performance of class counsel and monitor 
them effectively174 as opposed to first-time plaintiffs who may serve merely 
as “figurehead[s]” and have little ability to monitor class counsel.175 The 
named plaintiff’s ability to monitor class counsel increases with that named 
plaintiff’s exposure to different attorneys on different cases. If the 
professional plaintiff is represented by the same counsel over and over, the 
plaintiff will have no other frame of reference for assessing the performance 
of counsel. Being represented by the same counsel repeatedly also means a 
familiar relationship, which is one indicator that the named plaintiff may 
have a conflict of interest.176 At the same time, such repeat representation 
would likely not, by itself, lead the court to determine that the named plaintiff 
is an inadequate class representative. For example, the Seventh Circuit 
indicated that named plaintiffs could be disqualified on the basis of familial 
or personal relationships.177 But in another case where nondisclosure of a 
 
 170 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625. 
 171 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class—or a class proposed to 
be certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with 
the court’s approval.”). 
 172 See Harel & Stein, supra note 118, at 71 (discussing the inherent conflicts between class counsel 
and the class members). 
 173 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 174 Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 175 Nagareda, supra note 125, at 1488 (“A familiar insight in the literature—one voiced vividly 
by . . . scholars—holds that the class representative is often a mere figurehead, such that class counsel 
frequently operate free from conventional client monitoring.”). 
 176 See supra notes 128–132 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Redman v. RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 638 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that there should be 
a “genuine arm’s-length relationship between class counsel and the named plaintiffs” that is not 
influenced by family ties or friendship). 
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relevant business relationship signaled a conflict of interest, the court did not 
remove the named plaintiffs but merely denied their incentive awards.178 
Although consistent repeat representation by the same counsel likely 
would not disqualify a named plaintiff, it does create familiarity that both 
reduces the named plaintiff’s value as a monitor of class counsel and 
increases the possibility of collusive behavior. Because a greater variety of 
representation is related to the professional plaintiff’s value to the class as a 
monitor, the central inquiry in the conflict-of-interest analysis should be how 
often the professional plaintiff has been represented by the same counsel as 
opposed to different counsel.179 A more valuable named plaintiff (i.e., one 
represented by many different attorneys) would be entitled to a higher 
incentive fee, while a less valuable plaintiff (i.e., one with a familiar 
relationship to a specific attorney) would be entitled to a lower fee. 
The court’s conflict-of-interest analysis should also identify 
circumstances that courts have already recognized as problematic in the 
incentive-fee context. Specifically, when there are multiple named plaintiffs, 
provisions that provide for incentive fees only to those named plaintiffs who 
approve the settlement are generally disallowed because they give rise to 
conflicts of interest.180 Those provisions should be struck from the settlement 
agreement, and the court should scrutinize all other aspects of the proposed 
incentive fees more closely for conflicts of interest. 
Finally, because identifying conflicts of interest is integral to so many 
decisions involving class action litigation generally, it is useful to provide a 
final opportunity for trial courts to examine a proposed settlement for 
conflicts of interest, particularly when the settlement involves a large 
incentive fee. This final review for potential conflicts of interest may uncover 
something that the court was not aware of in the class-certification stage but 
that would justify denying final approval of a settlement or even 
reconsidering class certification.181 Thus, this final “conflicts of interest” 
factor as applied to incentive fees can be valuable to the court’s assessment 
of the class action in other contexts. 
Conflict-of-interest issues cannot be eliminated from class action 
lawsuits as currently constituted. Professors Alon Harel and Alex Stein have 
proposed radical changes to the system to address these conflicts,182 and these 
 
 178 In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 715 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 179 Cf. Nagareda, supra note 125, at 1488 (“Ideally, incentive awards should reward high-quality 
monitoring but not low-quality monitoring.”). 
 180 See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
 181 A court has the power to alter its class-certification decision until the litigation is complete. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). 
 182 See Harel & Stein, supra note 118, at 108–09. 
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radical changes could result in unforeseen collateral consequences. Most 
scholars focus on addressing conflicts of interest by analyzing attorney’s 
fees, which is a significant issue. While this is an important consideration, 
incentive fees have been largely overlooked as an area of concern and of 
potential in addressing conflict-of-interest issues. The framework proposed 
here addresses these concerns by directly identifying problems with conflicts 
of interest in incentive fees—many of which have been identified piecemeal 
by courts—into one central analysis. This proposed framework also adds a 
new dimension, which is a repeat plaintiff’s continued representation by the 
same counsel. If repeat plaintiffs are on notice that there is a chance that their 
incentive awards may be reduced by repeatedly being represented by the 
same counsel, then they will be incentivized to seek more varied 
representation. This not only reduces the probability of collusion, but also 
diversifies those plaintiffs’ experiences, making them more effective 
monitors of counsel in service to the class. 
CONCLUSION 
Regardless of one’s feelings about federal consumer-protection 
statutes, Congress passed these laws with an expectation that they would be 
enforced, and the class action mechanism is necessary for meaningful 
enforcement of these laws. But in order for the class action mechanism to 
operate, at least one class member must have adequate financial incentive to 
step forward and agree to be a named plaintiff. Without the “lure of an 
‘incentive award,’” rationally self-interested class members are not 
motivated to step forward based on the insignificant pro rata recovery in most 
of these cases.183 Multimillion-dollar consumer class actions would be 
foregone simply for want of a named plaintiff. And as a result, harms that 
Congress meant to address by passing these laws would go unremedied. For 
example, without the deterrence of potential class action liability, one might 
expect to receive twice the current number of robocalls. For these reasons 
and more, incentive fees are necessary and justified in consumer class action 
lawsuits. 
However, this does not mean that incentive awards come without risks. 
Courts should not overlook incentive-fee provisions when reviewing 
settlement agreements and need an adequate framework to guide them in 
doing so. Unfortunately, the prevailing framework does not adequately 
address the justifications for and dangers of incentive awards, which can 
cause confusion among district courts when assessing these awards. Even 
when district courts do identify the important considerations—as detailed in 
 
 183 In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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this Note—the real issues remain obscured by the ill-conceived Cook test. 
Federal courts can work more efficiently and effectively on the issue of 
incentive awards with better guidance. This Note suggests a new framework 
that would better assist district courts in assessing the appropriateness of 
incentive fees to ensure that they are justified and do not pose a danger to the 
interests of the absent class members. This framework would also encourage 
repeat named plaintiffs to seek more varied representation, making them 
more effective monitors of class counsel. 
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